We show that, assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, the first (weakly) inaccessible cardinal can satisfy a strong form of a Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic L(I), a logic introduced in [4] strictly between first order logic and second order logic. On the other hand we show that in the light of present day inner model technology, nothing short of a supercompact cardinal suffices for this result. In particular, we show that the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic at κ implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ as well as Projective Determinacy.
Introduction
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is perhaps the most quoted result about first order logic. It shows the "local" character of first order formulas. The truth of a first order sentence depends only on a small part of the set theoretical universe. For many purposes first order logic is ideal, but there are also interesting and useful extensions of first order logic.
Example 1
• Second order logic L 2 extends first order logic with quantifiers of the form ∃Rφ(R, x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ), where the second order variable R ranges over n-ary relations on the universe for some fixed n.
• The logic L(Q 1 ) extends first order logic with a new quantifier Q 1 binding one variable. The formula Q 1 x 0 φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) has the meaning "there are uncountably many elements x 0 satisfying φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 )".
• The logic L(Q x 0 x 1 φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) has the meaning "there is an uncountable set X such that any two elements x 0 and x 1 from X satisfy φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 )".
Second order logic is in a sense the opposite of first order logic. It is powerful enough to capture exactly a large part of the set theoretical universe. The logics L(Q 1 ) and L(Q MM ℵ 1 ) are more close to first order logic. The first is axiomatizable and so is the second, if we assume 3. In this paper we study the following two, in a sense intermediate, extensions of first order logic:
Example 2
• Equicardinality logic L(I) [4] . This logic extends first order logic by formulas of the form Ix 0 y 0 φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 )ψ(y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ) with the meaning: "for given a 1 , ..., a n−1 and b 1 , ..., b n−1 the cardinality of the set of elements x 0 satisfying φ(x 0 , a 1 , ..., a n−1 ) is the same as the cardinality of the set of elements y 0 satisfying ψ(y 0 , b 1 , ..., b n−1 )".
• Equicofinality logic L(Q ec ) [10] . This logic extends first order logic by formulas of the form Q ec x 0 x 1 y 0 y 1 φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 )ψ(y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ) with the meaning: "for given a 2 , ..., a n−1 and b 2 , ..., b n−1 , both the set of pairs of elements x 0 and x 1 satisfying φ(x 0 , x 1 , a 2 , ..., a n−1 ) and the set of pairs of elements y 0 and y 1 satisfying φ(y 0 , y 1 , b 2 , ..., b n−1 ) are linear orders, and moreover these linear orders have the same cofinality."
The logics L(I) and L(Q ec ) are in a clear sense between first order logic and second order logic. The results of this paper show that on the basis of ZFC alone there is mixed information as to whether L(I) and L(Q ec ) are closer to first order logic or to second order logic.
Very little is known about the logic L(Q ec ). Shelah [10] conjectures that this logic is compact and axiomatizable. The hidden power of this logic is revealed in models with a wellordering. There the quantifier Q ec can be used to pick elements of the well-ordering corresponding to regular cardinals. This puts severe limitations e.g. to the existence of small elementary submodels. In a sense, the stronger logic L(I, Q ec ) is better understood. At least we know that this logic is very far from compact and axiomatizable, because L(I) is.
There is a quite general concept of a logic, that the above examples are special cases of. We define it as follows: between models of vocabulary τ , sequences (a 0 , . . . , a n φ −1 ) of elements of A and formulas φ ∈ L. It is assumed that this relation satisfies the isomorphism axiom, that is, if π : A ∼ = B, then A |= φ[a 0 , . . . , a n φ −1 ] and B |= φ[πa 0 , . . . , πa n φ −1 ] are equivalent.
We call τ the vocabulary of the logic L.
Note, that no syntax is a priori assumed of a logic. The meaning of "φ has a model", and "the theory T ⊂ L has a model" is obvious. We write A ≡ L B if A |= φ and B |= φ are equivalent for all φ ∈ L with n φ = 0. We write A ≺ L B if A |= φ[a 0 , . . . , a n φ −1 ] and B |= φ[a 0 , . . . , a n φ −1 ] are equivalent for all φ ∈ L and all a 0 , . . . , a n φ −1 ∈ A.
We now define two natural invariants for any logic L:
The Löwenheim-Skolem number LS(L) of L is the smallest cardinal κ such that if a theory T ⊂ L has a model, it has a model of cardinality < max(κ, |T |). The Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski number LST(L) of L is the smallest cardinal κ such that if A is any τ -structure, then there is a substructure A of A of cardinality < κ such that A ≺ L A.
Note that LS(L) always exists, because L is a set. In general there is no guarantee that LST(L) exists, but if it exsists, it is at least as big as LS(L). We can think of the sizes of LS(L) and LST(L) as a "test" of how close the logic is to being first order. For first order logic these numbers are both ℵ 1 , and for L(Q 1 ) and L(Q MM 1 ) they are ℵ 2 . If κ is strongly inaccessible, then LST(L κκ ) = κ.
The Löwenheim-Skolem numbers of L(I) and L(Q ec ) are quite high in the hierarchy of cardinal numbers, certainly both cardinals are fixed points of the function α → ℵ α . Whether the Löwenheim-Skolem number of L(I) can be below the first weakly inaccessible, was asked in [15] and has been an open question ever since, but will be settled positively in this paper. On the other hand, in the inner model L µ it is easy to see that LS(L(I)) is above the measurable cardinal.
For second order logic, LS(L 2 ) is the supremum of Π 2 -definable ordinals ( [14] ), which means that it exceeds the first measurable, the first κ + -supercompact κ, and the first huge cardinal if they exist.
2. LST(L 2 ) exists if and only if supercompact cardinals exist, and then LST(L 2 ) is the first of them.
Proof. For the first claim, suppose T is a theory in L 2 and T has a model A. We may assume that the universe of A is an ordinal δ. Let i be an embedding into M with critical point κ such that T, A, P(δ) ∈ M . It is easy to prove by induction on formulas φ ∈ L 2 that for all a ∈ A n and
The point is that all subsets of A are in M . Thus M |= ∃x(x |= T and |x| < i(κ)). Hence there is in V a model of T of cardinality < κ. For the second claim we refer to [7] but give the following argument for LST(L 2 ) ≤ κ for supercompact κ since we will use it later: Suppose A is a model of cardinality λ. Let i be an elementary embedding of V into a transitive M so that λ M ⊆ M and i(κ) > λ. Let B be the pointwise image of A under i.
It is easy to prove by induction on formulas φ ∈ L 2 that for all a ∈ A n and X ∈ P(A n 1 ) × ... × P(A n k ) we have
Thus M |= ∃B(B ≺ A and |B| < i(κ)). Hence there is in V a model C ≺ A of T of cardinality < κ. 2
So second order logic meets the test of being very far from first order in terms of the size of its Löwenheim-Skolem numbers. We show that according to this test, L(I) and L(Q ec ) can be close to second order logic but can also be, relatively speaking, close to first order logic.
The strongest large cardinal axiom from the point of view of Löwenheim-Skolem theorems is Vopenka's Principle, which states that every proper class of structures of the same vocabulary has two members one of which is isomorphic to an elementary substructure of the other. In [12] an equivalent condition is given: Suppose A is a class. Let us call a cardinal κ A-supercompact if for all η > κ there is α < κ and an elementary embedding
with a critical point γ such that j(γ) = κ. It is proved in [12] that Vopenka's Principle is equivalent to the statement that for every class A there is an A-supercompact cardinal. From this and the proof of Theorem 5 we get the following unpublished result of J. Stavi:
Theorem 6 Vopenka's Principle holds if and only if every logic has a Löwen-heim-Skolem-Tarski number.
For the intermediate logics L(I) and L(I, Q
ec ) the analogue of Theorem 5 (2) is the substantially less conclusive:
1. LST(L(I)) exists only if inaccessible cardinals exist, and then LST(L(I)) is at least as large as the first of them.
LST(L(I, Q
ec )) exists only if Mahlo cardinals exist, and then the cardinal LST(L(I, Q ec )) is at least as large as the first of them.
Proof. Let A = (R(κ + ), ), where κ = LST(L(I)). By the definition of LST(L(I)) there is a transitive set M of power < κ and a monomorphism i : (M, ) → A which preserves L(I)-truth. Moreover, every M -cardinal is a real cardinal. Let λ be the largest cardinal in M . Clearly i(λ) = κ > λ. Let γ be the first ordinal moved by i. Trivially, γ is a limit cardinal. Suppose f ∈ M is a cofinal δ-sequence in γ for some δ < γ.
Thus γ is weakly inaccessible in M , and therefore, i(γ) is weakly inaccessible in V . The second claim is proved similarly. 2
The results of this paper explain why Theorem 7 is weaker than Theorem 5. The proof theoretic strength of the existence of either LST(L(I)) or LST(L(I, Q ec )) exceeds substantially what follows from the mere size of these cardinals. Accordingly, and unlike LST(L 2 ), the numbers LST(L(I)) and LST(L(I, Q ec )) do not have to be very high in the scale of large cardinals. We will show in this paper that LST(L(I)) can be the first weakly inaccessible cardinal and LST(L(I, Q ec )) can respectively be the first Mahlo cardinal. Also they can be of continuum size: Theorem 8 ( [13] ) Suppose κ is a supercompact cardinal and P is the notion of forcing C κ . Let L be a provably C-absolute logic which is provably a sublogic of
Proof. We give an outline of the proof for completeness. Suppose A is a name for a finitary structure with universe λ in the P -forcing language. Let i : V → M be an elementary embedding of the universe such that i(κ) > λ, λ M ⊆ M and i"κ = κ. Let B be the point-wise image of A under i. Using the fact that P preserve cardinals and cofinalities it is possible to show
It follows from this that
Therefore P A has an L-elementary substructure of power < κ.
2
To see some of the strength of the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem for the equicardinality quantifier, let us recall the following observation from [13] : Let A be the structure (R(κ + ), ∈). Let π : (M, ∈) → (R(κ + , ∈) be an elementary embedding with M transitive and |M | < κ.
# exists. Obviously this argument can be considerably strengthened. We show in this paper that the existence of LST(L(I)) has enough combinatorial power to imply, when combined with current state of the inner model technology, Projective Determinacy.
The Failure of Squares
We have already alluded to the fact that the existence of LST(L(I)) has non-trivial consistency strength, for example, it implies 0 # . In this section we show that the existence of LST(L(I)) has a much stronger consistency strength, probably at the level of a supercompact cardinal.
We shall show that the existence of an LST(K(I)) cardinal implies that the combinatorial principle λ fails for every λ ≥ κ. For κ singular of cofinality ω we can do better than that and show that any reasonable version of λ fails, in particular a consequence of any reasonable weakening of λ (for cof(λ) = ω) fails globally above LST(L(I)). The consequence we allude to is the existence of "good" scales.
We shall conclude this section by showing that assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal it is consistent that the first LST(L(I)) cardinal is the same as the first supercompact cardinal.
Definition 9
The square principle λ says: There is a sequence C α : α < λ + a limit ordinal , such that:
1. C α is closed unbounded subset of α.
2. The order type of C α is always ≤ λ.
3. If β is a limit point of C α , then C β = C α ∩ β.
Theorem 10
If κ is an LST(L(I)) number and λ ≥ κ. Then λ fails.
Proof. Suppose C α : α < λ + a limit ordinal , is a λ sequence. Consider the structure
where T is a function defined on the limit ordinals in λ + such that T (α) is the order-type of C α , and C is a ternary relation such that C(α, γ, η) holds if and only if "η is the γ-th member of C α ". Let B be an L(I)-elementary substructure of A of cardinality < κ. It is easily verified that the order-type of the universe B of B is a successor cardinal µ + , where µ is the ordertype of B ∩ λ. Let B * be the transitive collapse of B. It is easily seen that B * has the form µ + , µ, T * , C * , where for some µ -sequence C * α : α < µ + a limit ordinal , T * is a function defined on the limit ordinals in µ + such that T * (α) is the order-type of C * α , and C * is a ternary relation such that C * (α, γ, η) holds if and only if "η is the γ-th member of C * α ". Let π : B * → B be the inverse of the transitive collapse of N . Let δ = sup(B) = sup(π B * ). Note that δ < λ + and cof(δ) = µ + . C δ is a closed unbounded subset of δ, B = {π(α) : α < µ + } = π B * is cofinal in δ. So the set A = {η < δ : η limit point of C δ and a limit point of B} is closed unbounded in B δ . For η ∈ A letη be the minimal element of B * such that π(η) ≥ η. Obviously,η is always defined because sup(A ) = sup π B * = δ. And if
Claim: For η ∈ A , η is a limit point of C π(η) .
Proof. Otherwise, let ρ be sup(C π(η ) ∩ η). So our assumption is ρ < η. As η ∈ A , the range of π is cofinal in η, so there is ρ such that
By elementarity there is ρ such that
But clearly π(ρ ) < η, so we get a contradiction.
(Claim.)
Proof. Otherwise, let ρ be sup(C * π(η 2 ) ∩η 1 ). We assume ρ <η 1 , which means by definition ofη 1 that π(ρ) < η 1 . By the previous claim η 2 is a limit point of C π(η 2 ) . So by the definition of the square principle
On the other hand η 1 and η 2 are in A , hence they are limit points of C δ , so C η 2 = C δ ∩ η 2 , so η 1 is a limit point of C η 2 . This contradicts (2) . (Claim.)
It follows from the previous claim that if η 1 , η 2 ∈ A , then the order-type of C * η 2 exceeds the order-type of C * η 1
. So T * (η 2 ) > T * (η 1 ). The set A being cofinal in δ, it has order-type at least µ + , so T * is a monotone function from a set of ordinals of order-type ≥ µ + into µ, which is clearly a contradiction. (Theorem) Weaker versions are the following list of weaker and weaker principles.
Definition 11
The weak square principle κ,λ says: There is a sequence C α : α < κ a limit ordinal , such that:
1. C α is a set of closed unbounded subsets of α.
The principle λ,λ + , the so called "silly square" is actually provable (see the proof of Lemma 17), so the weakest reasonable principle is λ,λ . Our goal is now to show that if λ is singular of cofinality ω and above LST(L(I)), then λ,λ fails. This fact by itself indicates that the assumption of the existence of a LST(L(I)) cardinal has a large consistency strength. At the present it is not known how to get a model in which λ,λ fails even for a single singular λ without assuming a supercompact cardinal.
The way we shall prove the failure of λ,λ is by refuting an even weaker property: "The existence of a good sequence in λ ω /F IN of length λ + ." The definitions and facts about "good sequences in λ ω /F IN " are due to Shelah and based on his pcf theory ( [11] ). Since we shall need a much simpler version of the notions and the basic lemmas, we include them for the sake of completeness.
We consider elements of On ω ordered by eventual domination, i.e. for f, g ∈ On
for all but finitely many n < ω.
Definition 12 Suppose f α : α < µ is a < * -increasing sequence in On ω .
(i) A point δ ∈ µ is called a good point for the sequence if there is a cofinal set C ⊆ δ and a function α → n α from C to ω such that if α < β in C and k > max(n α , n β ), then f α (k) < f β (k).
(ii) The sequence is good, if there is a closed unbounded subset D of µ such that δ ∈ D implies that δ is a good point of the sequence.
Lemma 13 Suppose δ is a good point for the sequence f α : α < µ and D is any cofinal subset of δ. Then there is E ⊆ D witnessing the goodness of δ.
Proof. Let C and α → n α witness the goodness of δ.
(Lemma) Theorem 14 (Shelah [11] , see also [2] p.18) If cof(λ) = ω and λ,λ holds, then there is a good sequence in λ ω of length λ + .
Proof. Fix a sequence of regular cardinals λ n cofinal in λ. We shall actually get our sequence in n<ω λ n ⊆ λ ω . Note that every sequence of functions in n<ω λ n of size λ has a < * -upper bound in n<ω λ n (By taking g(n) = the supremum of f n (n) for the first λ n−1 of our functions).
Fix a λ,λ -sequence C α : α < κ a limit ordinal . Without loss of generality we can assume that otp(C) < λ for each C ∈ C α . (Indeed, if otp(C) = λ when C ∈ C α , then cof(α) = ω and we can replace C by an ω-sequence cofinal in α. Note that this C is never used as an initial segment of D ∈ C β for α < β because it would imply otp(D) > λ).
We define the < * -increasing sequence f α : α < λ + in n<ω λ n by induction. The successor stage is trivial: f α+1 (n) = f α (n). Suppose then α is limit. For each C ∈ C α we define a function in n λ n as follows:
Since C α ≤ λ, we can find f α ∈ n λ n such that g C < * f α for every C ∈ C α . Clearly f β < * f α for every β < α. We claim that f α : α < λ + is a good sequence. Actually the claim is that every limit δ < λ + is a good point of the sequence. If cof(δ) = ω, then we pick a cofinal sequence δ n : n < ω in δ. Let n(δ n ) be such that for i ≥ n(δ n ) we have
Clearly the set {δ n : n < ω} and the map δ n → n(δ n ) witness the goodness of δ. If cof(δ) > ω, pick C ∈ C δ and let C * be the set of limit points of C. Let n be such that otp(C) < λ n and also
So the set C * and the map β → n β witnesses the goodness of δ. (Theorem)
The result for the existence of LST(L(I)) number follows from
Theorem 15 Suppose κ = LST(LI) and λ ≥ κ with cof(λ) = ω. Then there is no no good sequence in λ ω of length λ + .
Since κ = LST (LI) there is
are true in A, they are true in B and it follows that for some cardinal µ < κ, otp(B) is µ + and otp(B ∩ λ) = µ. Let δ = sup(B). Note that δ is a limit point of D, and hence δ ∈ D. Since B is cofinal in δ, cof(δ) = µ + . By elementarity, each function f α , α ∈ B, maps ω into B ∩ λ. We now argue that δ cannot be a good point of f α : α < λ + . Assume otherwise. Then there is a cofinal set C ⊆ δ and a function α → n α from C to ω such that if α < β in C and k ≥ max(n α , n β ), then f a (k) < f β (k). By Lemma 13 we may assume C ⊆ B. Let C be cofinal in C such that n α is a fixed integer N for all α ∈ C . Now {f α (N ) : α ∈ C } is a subset of B ∩ λ which is of order-type µ + , a contradiction.
Corollary 16 If κ = LST(L(I)), then λ,λ fails for every singular λ ≥ κ of cofinality ω. Hence, in particular, PD holds.
The existence of LST(L(I)) also implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ, i.e. if λ is singular ≥ κ, then
It follows from Silver's singular cardinals theorem that if λ violates the SCH and cof(λ) > ω, then λ is a limit of cardinals that violate the SCH.
Lemma 17 ([11])
If λ is a singular cardinal of cofinality ω and λ violates the SCH, then there is a good sequence in λ ω of length λ + .
Proof. By Shelah [11] , if λ violates SCH and cof(λ) = ω, then there is a sequence λ n : n < ω cofinal in λ such that n λ n /F IN has true cofinality λ ++ , which implies that every set of functions in n λ n of cardinality λ + has a < * -upper bound in n λ n . Now one can repeat the proof Theporem 14 by replacing in that proof the λ,λ -sequence by a λ,λ + -sequence (the "Silly Square") and getting the good sequence in n λ n . The silly square is always true, for if C α is a cub subset of α of order type cof(α), we can let C α = {C β ∩ α : β < λ + , α limit point of C β } and then C α : α < λ + witnesses λ,λ + . The proof works as before using the fact that for every α < λ + |C α | ≤ λ + and that every set of functions in n λ n of cardinality λ + has a < * -upper bound.
Corollary 18 If κ = LST(L(I)), then SCH holds above κ.
Theorem 19
If it is consistent to assume the existence of a supercompact cardinal, then it is its consistent to assume that LST(L(I)) is the first supercompact cardinal.
Proof. We refer to Magidor [8] . In this paper, assuming the existence of a supercompact cardinal, a model is constructed in which the first supercompact is the first strongly compact. It is achieved by forcing over a model in which κ is supercompact and arranging for SCH to fail for unboundedly many λ's below κ, while preserving the supercompactness of κ. In the re-
). If µ < κ and µ ≥ LST(L(I)), then pick µ < λ < κ violating SCH to get a contradiction with Corollary 18. So κ = LST(L(I)) cardinal.
(Theorem)
In the next section we shall show that LST(L(I)) can be much smaller than the first supercompact cardinal, namely it can be the first inaccessible, so we are in a true "identity crisis" situation.
The First Mahlo Cardinal
As we pointed out in Theorem 7, LST(L(I, Q ec )) is, if it exists at all, at least as big as the first Mahlo cardinal. We now prove the consistency of LST(L(I, Q ec )) being actually equal to the first Mahlo cardinal. As Corollary 16 shows, we have to start from a cardinal substantially larger than a Mahlo, even a strong cardinal is not enough. So we start from a supercompact cardinal.
Theorem 20 It is consistent, relative to the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, that LST(L(I, Q ec )) is the first Mahlo cardinal.
Proof. Suppose κ is supercompact. We then make every ρ < κ non-Mahlo. Suppose ρ is Mahlo. Let P ρ be the set of closed bounded sets of singular cardinals < ρ inversely ordered by end-extension, i.e. a weaker condition is an initial segment of a stronger condition. For every regular λ < ρ the forcing notions P ρ contains a λ-closed dense set {C : max(C) > λ}. Therefore P ρ cannot collapse cardinals < ρ or change their cofinality. Moreover, P ρ does not add new bounded subsets to ρ. On the other hand, |P ρ | = ρ, so P ρ preserves all cardinals and cofinalities. In particular P ρ kills the Mahloness of ρ but preserves inaccessibility of ρ. Now we iterate this forcing. Suppose µ α , α < δ, is an increasing sequence of Mahlo cardinals. Let R 0 = P µ 0 . Suppose P α has been defined. Let P α Q α = P µα and R α+1 = R α Q α . For limit α be let R α be the direct limit of the previous stages, if α is inaccessible, and inverse limit otherwise. This will ensure that each R α , α inaccessible, will have the α-c.c. and will therefore preserve the Mahloness of each µ β ,
. To see why, suppose A is a structure with universe λ, where λ ≥ κ. Since κ is supercompact, there is j : V → M , M transitive, such that λ M ⊆ M and j(κ) > λ. Note that j(R) = R P κ R >κ , where R >κ contains a κ-closed set. Since R has the κ-c.c. and R >κ is sufficiently closed, j can be extended to j * : V R → M j(R) . Now we can continue as above. 2 
The First Inaccessible Cardinal
In this section we prove the main result of this paper:
Theorem 21 If ZFC+"There is a supercompact cardinal" is consistent, so is ZFC+"There is an inaccessible cardinal"+"LST(L(I)) is the first inaccessible cardinal".
The assumption of the consistency of a supercompact cardinal seems, on the basis of present technology, almost unavoidable. By Theorem 15 above, we know that the existence of LST(L(I)) implies the negation of λ,λ for every large enough λ. The only known way to get a model in which this holds is to start from a strongly compact cardinal. But the definition of strong compactness is not sufficient for getting reflection principles which seem to be necessary for getting the existence of LST(L(I)), so the assumption of a supercompact cardinal seems natural enough.
Outline of the Proof
We start with a supercompact cardinal κ. In our final model κ will be the first inaccessible cardinal, while preserving enough of the reflection properties of a supercompact cardinal, so that in the model κ will be LST(L(I)).
In the process of achieving this we force a closed unbounded set C of singular cardinals below κ. This will make κ non-Mahlo. We then collapse cardinals between consecutive elements of C so that none of them can be inaccessible. Thus κ has become the first inaccessible. But we have to be careful about the way in which we collapse cardinals in order to maintain enough reflection properties of κ, so that κ will be LST(L(I)). To argument that LST(L(I)) = κ in the final model is similar to the argument of Theorem 4. Namely, suppose P is the forcing used to get our final model and A is a name for a finitary structure in V P with domain λ. Let i : V → M be an elementary embedding of the universe such that i(κ) > λ and λ M ⊆ M , where κ is the critical point of i (V is our ground model). P will be a forcing such that P as a forcing notion is a regular subforcing of i(P ). In V i(P ) we can define an embedding i * : V P → M i(P ) extending i. By our assumption i * A ∈ V P , and i * A is an embedding of A into i * (A). We would like i * to preserve formulas of L(I). Given that we are done because
By elementarity,
A has an L(I)-elementary substructure of cardinality < κ".
To get i * to preserve formulas of L(I) we need that i(P )/P collapses no cardinals ≤ λ.
Suppose that when we collapsed cardinals between consecutive members of C we had some function f : κ → κ such that for a member δ of C no cardinal was collapsed between δ and f (δ). Let us also assume that λ < i(f )(κ). (Note that κ is a limit point of i * (C).) So no cardinal between κ and i(f )(κ) will be collapsed. In particular, all cardinals between κ and λ are preserved by i(P )/P .
Another issue is that κ is supposed to be a limit point of i * (C) hence in M i(P ) it is supposed to be singular. In V P it is supposed to be regular, indeed inaccessible. So we need i(P )/P to make some regular cardinals singular. Since i(P ) "looks like P ", we need P to make enough regular cardinals singular, so that M i(P ) |= "κ is singular". The standard way of making a regular cardinal singular is by forcing with Prikry forcing on a measurable cardinal. Since we shall have to do it for many cardinals below κ, we shall have to iterate Prikry type forcings for measurable cardinals below κ.
So the forcing notion we shall use will be an iteration of several steps:
(a) Iterated Prikry type forcing for every measurable λ < κ, where besides changing the cofinality of λ to ω we do some preparatory forcing for the additional steps, which will be relevant only to κ. We denote this forcing by Q λ and the iteration up to κ by P κ .
(b) On κ we force a closed unbounded set C such that every limit point of C is singular. We denote this forcing by NM(κ) (From "Non-Mahlo").
(c) We collapse cardinals between consecutive members of C making sure that if β ∈ C, then no cardinals are collapsed between β and f (β) for an appropriate function f : κ → κ. (We denote this forcing Col(C)).
The challenge will be to make sure that NM(κ) * Col(C) embeds nicely into Q κ so that if R = P κ * NM(κ) * Col(C), then R embeds nicely into i * (R). This will be achieved by embedding NM(κ) * Col(C) into Q κ , which is the κ-th stage in the iteration of i * (P κ ) = P i * (κ) . We hope that these remarks make the following definition of the forcing notion somewhat less frightening.
The Forcing Construction
Our first step is to define the function f : κ → κ that will determine intervals where all the cardinals will be preserved. We assume that our ground model satisfies G.C.H. and that there is no inaccessible above κ. A classical lemma of Laver [5] proves the following:
Lemma 22 Let κ be supercompact. Then there exists a function h : κ → V κ such that for every x and every µ ≥ κ there is a µ-supercompact embedding
An easy corollary of Laver's lemma is the following:
Lemma 23 Let κ be supercompact such that there is no inaccessible cardinal above κ. Then there is a function f : κ → κ such that for all α < κ, α < f (α), there is no inaccessible cardinal λ with α < λ ≤ f (α), and for all µ ≥ κ there is a µ-supercompact embedding j : V → M with µ < j(f )(κ).
Proof Let h be the Laver-function from Lemma 22. Let f (α) = (h(α))
is an ordinal > α such that there is no inaccessible cardinal λ with α < λ ≤ h(α). Define f (α) = α + otherwise. Apply Lemma 22 for µ and x = µ + . Note that in M there is no inaccessible cardinal λ with κ < λ ≤ j(h)(κ) = µ + so for j(f )(κ) the first possibility of the definition of f holds and hence j(f )(κ) = µ + > µ.
So from now on we fix such a function f . Without loss of generality we can assume that the first inaccessible cardinal is closed under f . The cardinals that we shall be interested in will be cardinals λ ≤ κ such that λ is measurable and λ is closed under the function f . For such λ we define the forcing notion NM(λ), which is intended to make λ non-Mahlo by forcing a closed unbounded set C of cardinals such that every limit point of C is singular. For technical simplicity it will be convenient to assume that if β ∈ C and β is the minimal member of C above β, then β is inaccessible and f (β) < β .
Definition 24 Suppose λ is a measurable cardinal, closed under f . Then NM(λ) is the set of all closed bounded subsets C of λ such that (a) Every member of C is a cardinal.
(b) If β is a limit point of C, then β is singular.
(c) If β ∈ C, and β is the first point of C above β, then β is inaccessible and f (β) < β .
The partial order ≤ on NM(λ) is defined by D ≤ C iff D, C ∈ NM(λ) and D is an end-extension of C.
So the successor members of C are all regular, and limit points of C are closed under f . It is easy to see that if C ∈ NM(λ), and C contains a point above µ < λ, then {D : D ≤ C} is µ − closed. Hence it follows that forcing with NM(λ) introduces no new µ-sequences of ordinals when µ < λ. So λ remains regular, and since no new bounded subsets of λ are introduced, λ remains strongly inaccessible. Also, it is easy to see that if G ⊆ NM(λ) is a generic filter, then G is a closed unbounded subset of λ. Every limit point of G is singular, so in the generic extension λ is a non-Mahlo inaccessible cardinal.
Since we are going to define many partial orders, we shall denote each of the relevant partial orders by ≤. Only in case of a possible confusion we shall add the subscript indicating the forcing notion (≤ P for the partial order of P , etc). Also in some cases it will ne convenient to define a preorder on the forcing notion (so we may write p ≤ q and q ≤ p), so that we really mean the forcing notion is the equivalence classes of the relation "p ≤ q and q ≤ p".
Given two regular cardinals µ < ρ, Col(µ, < ρ) is the usual Levy collapse of all the cardinals δ with µ < δ < ρ to µ. It is a µ-closed forcing notion and if ρ is inacessible or the successor of a regular cardinal, the forcing notion Col(µ, < ρ) satisfies the ρ-c.c.
Let C be a closed set of cardinals. For β ∈ C −{sup(C)} let β be the next point of C after β. We assume that if β ∈ C, then β is inaccessible and f (β) < β . The forcing notion Col(C) is defined to be the Easton product of Col(f (β), < β ) for β ∈ C −{sup(C)}. (Easton product means that it is the collection of all functions g defined on C −{sup(C)} such that g(β) ∈ Col(f (β), < β ) and for regular δ the set {β < δ : g(δ) = ∅} is bounded in δ.) Note that for our case, if C ⊆ λ is the closed unbounded set introduced by NM(λ), then the Easton condition simply means that if g ∈ Col(C) then the cardinality of {β : g(β) = ∅} is less than λ.
It is easy to see that if C is NM(λ)-generic and the first member of C is below the first inaccessible, then if we force with Col(C), then λ will be the first inaccessible.
Atomic Step
Let λ be a measurable cardinal ≤ κ closed under f . We shall describe a variation Q λ of Prikry forcing for making λ singular of cofinality ω, while at the same time introducing a generic object over V to NM(λ). Like Prikry forcing, Q λ will introduce no new unbounded subsets of λ. Q λ has an additional role which we shall explain below. Note that we have
(Note that in V NM(λ) the cardinal λ is still regular.) The forcing Q λ has an additional role which we shall explain below. Like Prikry-forcing, Q λ will introduce no new bounded subsets of λ. The final stage of our iteration will be forcing with NM(κ) followed by Col(D), where D is the closed unbounded set introduced by NM(κ). We shall need to embed the forcing NM(κ) * Col
Because, for instance, in NM(κ) the cardinal κ is regular, but in V Q κ it is singular of cofinality ω, so the meaning of the Easton Product used in the definition of Col(D) is very different.) But note that because V NM(κ) and V Q κ have the same bounded
The issue is the genericity of G ∩ V over V NM(κ) . In general, G ∩ V does not have to be generic over V NM(κ) . The additional role of Q λ (for all λ ≤ κ) will be to introduce a condition in h ∈ Col
. For the next definition we fix a normal ultrafilter U on λ.
Definition 25 Q λ is the set of all objects p of the form α 0 , ..., α n−1 , A, c, h, C, H ,
(iii) c ∈ NM(λ), c contains some point below the first inaccessible, and α i ∈ c for i < n.
(iv) h ∈ Col(c) (v) C is a function defined on A such that for all β ∈ A we have C(β) ∈ NM(λ) with min(C(β)) = β.
(vi) H is a function defined on A such that for β ∈ A we have H(β) ∈ Col(C(β)).
(vii) For all β ∈ A we have sup(c) < β and α n−1 < β.
(viii) For all β, β ∈ A such that β < β we have sup(C(β)) < β .
The intuitive meaning of the forcing is rather clear. The finite sequence α 0 , ..., α n−1 is an initial segment of the ω-sequence that will be cofinal in λ. The set A is the set of possible candidates for extending the sequence α 0 , ..., α n−1 . As usual for Prikry type forcings, we require to have a large set of possible candidates to be members of the ω-sequence leading up to λ. The set c is an initial segment of the generic object in NM(λ) that will be introduced by Q λ , h is a partial information about an object that will eventually be a condition in Col
, where D will be the club introduced by the NM(λ) generic filter. For β ∈ A the set C(β) is a commitment, in case β will be added to the sequence, that the future generic object of NM(λ) will contain C(β). (Not as initial segment because it will have to continue c and possibly other c(γ)'s for γ's that were included in the sequence before β.) Similarly for H(β). These remarks motivate the definition of the partial order in Q λ :
Definition 26 (The partial order of Q λ ). Suppose
We say that q extends p, in symbols q ≤ p, if
(ii) A * ⊆ A, 
n } (Namely, we do not add any additional information about the forcing condition we construct in Col(D) below α * n .)
is an extension (as a member of NM(λ)) of C(α) and H * (β) is an extension (as a member of Col(C * (α)) of H(α). Note that H(α), being a member of Col(C(α)) can be considered also to be a member of C * (α) since C * (α) is an extensions of C(α).
If n = k above, we say that q is a direct extension of p, in symbols q ≤ * p.
Notation: If p = α 0 , ..., α n−1 , A, c, h, C, H is in Q λ we call n the length of p and denote it by n(p). Similarly
Note that if µ < λ then every decreasing sequence of direct extension of length ≤ µ has a lower bound which is a direct extension of all the members of the sequence. To see this one uses the fact that the c parts and h parts of all the members of the sequence are the same, and if α is in the intersection of the A part of the member fo the sequence and α > µ, then since C(α) is assumed to contain α, the sequence of the c-parts has a lower bound because NM(λ) is µ + -closed under a condition containing a point above µ. A similar argument takes care of the H part.
The following lemma is a typical one for Prikry type forcing. Its proof is a straight-forward generalization of similar lemmas proved before (e.g. Magidor [9] ):
Lemma 27 Let Φ be a statement in the forcing language for Q λ and p ∈ Q λ . Then there exists a direct extension q of p such that q decides Φ.
As usual, it follows from the lemma that Q λ introduces no new bounded subsets of λ.
We show that an extension of p forces that E ∩ D G = ∅. For every α ∈ A the set c ∪ C(α) is a condition in NM(λ), so it has an extension in E. Denote this extension by C * (α). Let
This is an extension of p (in fact a direct extension). Any extension of p * of length > n forces E ∩ D G = ∅.
(Lemma)
We abuse notation by denoting also ∪D G by D G . It is a club in λ in which limit points are all singulars. Its minimal point is below the first inaccessible cardinal. (Recall clause (iii) of Definition 25.) As usual, {α(p) : p ∈ G} is an ω-sequence cofinal in λ, so λ has cofinality ω in V [G]. Now let us consider the h-parts of conditions in G.
Proof: H G is clearly a partial function defined on β ∈ D G . Note that if p, q are in G, each of them of length > n, then if α n is the n-th coordinate (in both of them) of their α-part, then h(p) α n = h(q) α n . It means that
Now h(p) ∈ Col(c(p)), so for every
, where β is the first member of D G above β. By (3) also H G α n has Easton support, but since λ = sup n<ω α n is singular, it follows that the support constraint in Col
The next lemma explains the role of the h part of the conditions in Q λ .
Lemma 30 Let
Proof: G * * is obviously a filter. We have to verify genericity. So letE be an NM(λ)-term, which is forced to be a dense open subset of Col
Without loss of generality we can assume that α ∈ A implies α is inaccessible. Fix α ∈ A and consider c ∪ C(α) which is a condition in NM(λ) such that α belongs to it. Assume for a while that c
(Remember that we start collapsing cardinals above α at f (α) > α.) So by standard arguments the following set is dense open subset of
Without loss of generality we can assumeg is essentially a bounded subset of λ and since forcing with NM(λ) does not add bounded subsets of λ, we can assume that we have a particular g α which we can assume to be in Col(c * a ) such that c * α
The condition c * α must be of the form c ∪ c * * α where c * * α is an end extension of C(α). So we define the extension of p to be
where C * (α) = c * * α and H * (α) = g α . The set A * is a subset of A in U such that each α ∈ A satisfies the conditions (v), (vi) and (viii) of Definition 25 with respect to the new C and H parts. Now assume q ∈ G, let q be an extension of q of length > n. Let α be the n-th element of the α-part of q . Then α ∈ A * . The c part of q extends c ∪ C
(Because it is a set of bounded subsets of λ and all bounded subsets of λ in
We also want to show that Q λ collapses no cardinals. By Lemma 27 forcing with Q λ introduces no new bounded subsets of λ, so no cardinals < λ are collapsed.
We assume G.C.H., Q λ has cardinality 2 λ = λ + so no cardinals above λ + are collapsed. So the only cardinal we have to consider is λ + . Forcing with Q λ makes λ singular of cofinality ω, so if λ + is not a cardinal it becomes singular of cofinality < λ. In order to handle this case we need arguments similar to Magidor [9] . First we need the following definition:
Definition 31 Let q ≤ p be as in Definition 26. Let
where A * * is the set {β ∈ A : α * k−1 < β}.
We call r the Interpolant of p, q (Int(p, q) ). The condition r is the maximal extension of p such that q is a direct extension of it. Note that knowing p, the condition r is determined by α * n , ..., α * k−1 , c * and h * . Since the cardinality of possible α * n , ..., α * k−1 , c * , h * is λ, we get that the set {Int(q, p) : q ≤ p} is of size λ.
The following lemma is exactly like Theorem 2.6 in Magidor [9] .
Lemma 32 Let D be a dense open subset of Q λ and let p ∈ Q λ have length n. Then there exists a direct extension q of p (q ≤ * p) such that if t ≤ q and t ∈ D, then Int(t, q) ∈ D.
Lemma 33 In V Q λ the cardinal λ + is still a cardinal.
Proof: Suppose p forces that τ is a function µ → λ + , µ < λ, and τ is cofinal in λ + . For α < µ, let D α consist of such q that either q is incompatible with p, or q ≤ p and q forces a value for τ (α). Use Lemma 32 µ times to get a ≤ * -decreasing sequence q α : α ≤ µ where q 0 = q, and q α+1 satisfies Lemma 32 with respect to D α . For every α < µ the possible values for τ (α) when we force below q µ are determined by a member of {Int(t, q µ ) : t ≤ q µ }, so it has cardinality ≤ µ. Hence the range of τ is included in a set of V of cardinality µ · λ < λ + . So the range of τ is bounded in λ + , a contradiction. 
Iteration
We would like to iterate the forcing Q λ for all measurable λ < κ. The scheme of iteration we shall use is the scheme introduced by Gitik [3] . Our terminology follows (with minor changes) the terminology of [3] .
Definition 35 Suppose λ is a regular cardinal. A forcing notion P, ≤ is said to be λ-Prikry if there is a partial order ≤ * ⊆≤ on P such that (a) Every ≤ * -decreasing sequence of length less than λ has a ≤ * -lower bound.
(b) For every statement Φ in the forcing language for for P and for every p ∈ P there is q ∈ P such that q ≤ * p and q decides Φ.
We call ≤ * the direct extension relation.
Note that we do not assume that any two strict extensions of p are necessarily compatible. The remarks above show that if λ is measurable and U is a normal ultrafilter on λ, then Q λ is a λ-Prikry forcing notion.
When we refer to Prikry forcing notions in the sequel we assume that they are given with ≤ * , that is, they are of the form P, ≤, ≤ * . We shall also assume that each forcing notion P is given with its maximal element 1 P .
Definition 36 An iteration
is called a Gitik iteration of Prikry forcings if the following holds: Each P α is a forcing notion of sequences of length α such that (i) If p = τ β : β < α ∈ P α and γ < α, then p γ = τ β : β < γ ∈ P γ .
(ii) If p = τ β : β < α ∈ P α and γ < α then p γ Pγ τ γ ∈ Q γ , where Q γ is a P γ -name forced over P γ to denote a γ-Prikry forcing with the partial orders ≤ γ , ≤ * γ .
(iii) The sequence has Easton support, namely for every regular γ ≤ α the set {β < γ : τ β = 1 Q β } has cardinality < γ.
(iv) Q γ is the trivial forcing notion unless both γ is Mahlo and P β |Q β | < γ for every β < γ.
The partial order on P α is defined as follows: Suppose q = τ * β : β < α and p = τ β : β < α . Then q ≤ p if there is a finite set B ⊆ {β < α : τ β = 1 Q β } such that:
(Namely, we can take a non-direct extension of any point β in which τ β = 1 Q β and only at finitely many points β in which τ β = 1 Q β .) The direct extension for P α is defined as q ≤ * p if in the above definition we can take B = ∅.
Let us fix now a Gitik iteration P α : α ≤ µ , Q α : α < µ of Prikry forcings. Now Lemma 1.3 of Gitik [3] is essentially:
Lemma 37 Let α be Mahlo such that Pγ |Q γ | < α for all γ < α. Then P α has cardinality ≤ α and it satisfies the α − c.c..
Lemma 1.4 of Gitik [3] is essentially:
Lemma 38 Let Φ be a statement for the forcing language for P µ and p ∈ P µ . Then there is q ≤ * p such that q Φ or q ¬Φ.
It follows that if α is the first such that Q α is not the trivial forcing notion, then P µ is α-Prikry. Also, if α is a Mahlo cardinal such that Pγ |Q γ | < α for all γ < α, then in V Pα we can consider
to be a Gitik iteration of Prikry forcing notions, so in particular we get:
Lemma 39 If α < µ is a Mahlo cardinal such that Pγ |Q γ | < α for all γ < α, then (i) P µ /P α is an α-Prikry forcing notion.
(ii) Every bounded subset of α in V Pµ belongs already to V Pα . (So, in particular, no α satisfying the above requirement is collapsed.)
The next lemma is a variation of Lemma 1.5 in Gitik [3] and it deals with the preservation of measurable cardinals by the Gitik iterations:
Lemma 40 Let α ≤ µ be measurable such that 2 α = α + and P β |Q β | < α for all β < α. Let A = {β < α : P β "Q β is the trivial forcing notion"}. Let U be a normal ultrafilter on α such that A ∈ U . Then in V Pα the filter U can be extended to a normal ultrafilter. In particular, α remains measurable.
Proof: Let j be the ultrapower embedding j : V κ /U → M . Note that j( P β : β ≤ α , Q β : β < α ) is in M a Gitik iteration of Prikry forcings of length j(α). Let us denote the new iteration P * β : β ≤ j(α) , Q * β : β < j(α) . Since P β |Q β | < α for all β < α, we get that for all β < α |P β | < α, Q * β = Q β , P * β = P β and also P * α = P α . Our assumption that A ∈ U translates into Pα "Q α is the trivial forcing notion." So M Pα "P j(α) /P α is an α + -Prikry forcing notion."
The forcing P α satisfies the α-c.c. and has cardinality α with 2 α = α + , so we can enumerate in V in a sequence of length α + all P α -terms forced to denote subsets of α. Let this list be Å δ : δ < α + . Note that since M is closed under α-sequences, initial segments of the sequence j(Å δ ) : δ < α + are in M . Now we argue in V Pα . By induction define a ≤ * -decreasing sequence
Pα we can consider it to be a P * j(α) /P α -term. By P * j(α) /P α we can find such a condition p δ+1 ≤ * -extending p δ . Every initial segment of the sequence p δ : δ < α + is in M , so at limit stages δ we can take p δ to be a ≤ * -lower bound for p η : η < δ .) Now in V Pα define the ultrafilter U * extending U by
It is easy to check that U * is well-defined and that it is a normal ultrafilter in V Pα extending U . (Lemma 40)
The Final Model
We are now ready to define our final model in which the first inaccessible will be a LST(L(I)). Let us fix a supercompact cardinal κ. Recall that we assume G.C.H. to hold in V . We start the construction by defining a Gitik iteration P α : α ≤ κ , Q α : α < κ ) of Prikry forcings. of length κ. The iteration will be defined if we inductively define Q α . By induction it will be clear that for α < γ, γ Mahlo, we have |Q α | < γ. So we define:
(i) If α is not measurable in V then Q α is the trivial forcing notion.
(ii) If α is measurable in V , then we pick a normal ultrafilter U on α such that A = {β < α : β non-measurable} ∈ U .
Then α and U satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 37. So in V Pα the cardinal α is still measurable with a normal ultrafilter extending U . Define Q α to be the Q α as defined in Section 4.2.1. It is an α-Prikry forcing and its cardinality is 2 α which is less that the next Mahlo cardinal. So the iteration is defined. Since P κ is of cardinality κ and satisfies the κ-c.c., the cardinal κ is still Mahlo in V Pκ . (In fact, by Lemma 37 it is still measurable.) So now we force over V Pα with NM(κ) to get a closed unbounded subset D of κ such that each of the limit points of D is singular, and then we force with Col(D). So our final forcing notion is
Forcing with Col(D) makes sure that there are no inaccessible cardinals < κ. Forcing with NM(κ) keeps κ inaccessible, similarly for Col(D), so in V Pκ NM(κ) Col(D) the cardinal κ is the first inaccessible. Our goal will be achieved when we show:
Proof: Denote V * = V Pκ . In V * the cardinal κ is still measurable, so by picking a normal ultrafilter U on κ we can define the forcing Q κ and force with it over V * . Let G be the generic filter in Q κ . By Lemma 28 we can define from G an NM(κ) filter D G which is going to be generic over V * . We can force further with Col(D G ). Let G * be the generic filter, where we can assume that a structure A = λ, R 1 , R 2 , ... (without loss of generality we may assume that the universe of the structure is an ordinal λ). We have to get a substructure A of A such that A ≺ L(I) A and |A | < κ. Without loss of generality we may assume that κ + ≤ λ. In V the cardinal κ is supercompact, so we fix in V an embedding j : V → M such that κ is the critical point of j, j(κ) > λ, M λ ⊆ M and by our definition of the function f we can assume that j(f )(κ) > λ. The structure A is the realization of a termÅ in the forcing language for P κ NM(κ) Col(D). We can assumeÅ ∈ M because |P κ NM(κ) Col(D)| = κ.
Consider in M the forcing notion j(P κ ) j(NM(κ)) j(Col(D)). The forcing notion j(P κ ) is (in M ) an iteration of length j(κ). Its first κ steps are exactly like in V (They are defined in V κ which is the same as in M ). The κ-th step of the iteration is Q κ , so j(P κ ) = P κ Q κ T , where T is the iteration in M between κ and j(κ).
Lemma 43
One can force over V 1 to get a generic filter in the forcing j(P κ ) j(Q κ ) j(Col(D)) such that in the resulting model there is an embedding , and where furthermore G * is the generic filter in Col(D) over V Qκ . The generic filter for P κ Q κ provides the generic filter for the first κ + 1 steps of the iteration of j(P κ ) over M . (Note that Q κ is the same in the sense of M Pκ and V Pκ ). Follow this forcing by forcing with T . So we get a generic filter for P κ Q κ T = j(P κ ). Recall that we assumed that κ is the last inaccessible in V so there are no inaccessibles (and hence no measurable) between κ and λ. Since M λ ⊆ M , the same is true in M . So the iteration of j(P κ ) between κ and λ + is the trivial iteration, so T is a Gitik iteration of µ-Prikry forcings for λ + ≤ µ. It means that P(λ) ∩ V Pκ Qκ = P(λ) ∩ M Pκ Qκ = P(λ) ∩ V j(Pκ) .
Hence no cardinals ≤ λ are collapsed in M j(Pκ) . We now have to force with j(NM(κ)) which is NM(j(κ)) in the sense of M j(Pκ) . The club D introduced by NM(κ) is in V Pκ Qκ so it belongs to M Pκ Qκ ⊆ M j(Pκ) . In M Pκ Qκ the cardinal κ is singular of cofinality ω. So D ∪ {κ} is a condition in NM(j(κ)) (It is a closed subset of j(κ), every limit point, including κ, is singular. The other conditions are easily verified.) So we can pick a generic filter D * in NM(j(κ)) such that D∪{κ} is an initial segment of it. Forcing with NM(j(κ)) over M j(Pκ) does not add any bounded subsets of j(κ), so again no cardinals ≤ λ are collapsed. Denote by H the generic filter over V in P κ NM(κ) Col(D). We have defined a generic filter in j(P κ NM(κ) Col(D)). Let us denote this by H * . We claim that the particular way we have defined H * guarantees that H * satisfies a condition which is known as "the master condition" i.e.
